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RECENT CASES
AnmIRALTY JURISDIcTION-RIGHT OF INJURED SEAMAN TO SUE

His EM-

PLOYER IN STATE COURT-Plaintiff, member of a crew on a fishing vessel,

instituted suit against the owner of the vessel in the state court of Washington to recover $25,ooo damages for injuries sustained in the course of his
employment due to the negligence of the owner. Defendant filed bill in admiralty in the federal court to limit his liability to $5,ooo, the value of the
boat, and to enjoin the prosecution of the suit in the state court. Held, that
the injury having occurred with the knowledge and privity of the defendant,
he is not entitled to limit his liability, and therefore admiralty lacks jurisdiction to intervene. The Aloha, 35 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
In American admiralty law, administered by the federal courts, there
has existed a policy of limiting the liability of owners of vessels for maritime torts1 in order to encourage shipbuilding and shipping in the United
States.2 Consequently, it was a doctrine of admiralty law that a seaman
injured through the negligence of his master or fellow servant could recover
only his expenses for maintenance and cure.3 However, as a result of the
modem tendency to enlarge the rights of the employee, Congress in i92o
enacted the Jones Act,' which extended to injured seamen the same rights that
were given railroad employees under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,'
thereby giving them a right of action to recover damages for injury resulting
from negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of the ship.' The
Jones Act further provided that an injured seaman could at his election pursue
his remedy in the common law courts of a state with the right to have the
question of negligence determined by a jury.7 However, this statute did not
repeal the Limited Liability Act,' which permits the owner to limit his lia1 Admiralty jurisdiction depends upon locality: the tort must have been
committed on the high seas or on navigable waters. The Plymouth, 3 Wall.
2o (U. S. 1865); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Monterey, 6 F. (2d)

893 (N. D. Cal. 1925) ; (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 298; (1927) 25 MIcH.

L. REV. 667.
' Moore v. American Transportation Co., 24 How. I (U. S. 1861) ; Butler
v. Boston Steamship Co., 130 U. S.527, 9 Sup. Ct. 612 (1888).
'The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 23 Sup. Ct. 483 (1903) ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501 (igi8).
'41 STAT. 1007 (1921), 46 U. S. C. §688 (1926).
335 STAT. 65 (1909), 45 U. S. C. §51 (1926).

' Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, 47 Sup. Ct. 6oo
(1927) ; (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 49o; Note (1925) 20 IL.. L. REV. 156.

' State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in actions
for personal injuries under the Jones Act. Panama Railroad v. Vasquez, 271
U. S. 557, 46 Sup. Ct. 596 (1926) ; Patrone v. Howlett, 237 N. Y. 394, 143
N. E.
8 232 (1924); Note (1925) I WASH. L. REV. 141.
9 STAT. 635 (I85I), 46 U. S. C. § 183 (1926).
The limitation of the

shipowner's liability in American courts is treated in Note (I93O) 78 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 393.
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bility in admiralty to the extent of the value of the vessel and her freight,
in all cases where an injury occurs from negligence without his privity or
knowledge.' The plaintiff must establish negligence, but the defendant who
seeks to limit his liability has the burden of proving that he had no personal
knowledge of the situation from which the injury arose." Where the defendant establishes his right to limit his liability in admiralty," the federal
court obtains jurisdiction over the case and will issue an injunction to restrain
the prosecution of the suit in the state court." Thus, when an injured seaman
has elected to sue at law, the jurisdiction of admiralty depends upon the right
of the owner to limit his liability, which right exists only if the owner had no
personal participation in the negligence which caused the injury. In dismissing the suit in admiralty, the court in the principal case properly applied the
rule, since the owner should not be permitted to deprive the injured seaman
of his right to have negligence determined by a jury where the owner had
full knowledge of the situation in which the injury occurred.

AmAL LAw-FEDERAL REGULATION QF INTERSTATE AmcAAT-Farmer
was injured when his horses, frightened by defendant's dirigible, ran away.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant's negligence consisted of flying below an
altitude of five hundred feet in violation of federal air traffic rules established
by the Secretary of Commerce, but did not sufficiently aver whether dqfendant was engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce. Held, inter alc, that
plaintiff could recover under the Air Commerce Rules only if he proved that
defendant was engaged in interstate commerce or operating in such a manner
as to be a menace to interstate commerce. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., et al., 35 Fed. (2d) 761 (1929).
Of late the Supreme Court has shown a decided tendency to give a broad
effect to the federal government's power of regulating commerce between the
states. The federal right has been held supreme even where interstate movements were only remotely affected. Therefore, when the necessity for federal regulation of air commerce became pressing, the commerce clause of the
Constitution was turned to as a basis from which to project federal control
'In re East River Co., 266 U. S. 355, 45 Sup. Ct. 114 (924) ; Nelson v.
Curtis, i F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924); El Mundon, 7 F. (2d) iOO5 (C.
C. A. 2d, i925).
'"The 84-H, 296 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 264 U. S. 596,
44 Sup. Ct. 454 (1924) ; The Linseed King, 24 F. (2d) 967 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
Negligence of a subordinate is not sufficient of itself to charge the owner
with personal knowledge. La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664 (1908);
Note (191o)

58 U.

OF

PA. L. REV. 230.

" State courts do not have jurisdiction to administer the Limitation of
Liability Act. In re Crosby Fisheries, 24 F. (2d) 555 (W. D. Wash. 1928).
'In re East River Co., supra note 9; The Victoria, 3 F. (2d) 330 (W. D.
Wash. 1924).

'Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 257 U. S. 563,
42 Sup. Ct. 232 (19)
; State of New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 59I,
42 Sup. Ct. 239 (1922).
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of the air.2 The admiralty clause,' the treaty making power,' and the war
power ' of the federal government were also suggested as the means of federal regulation, but this great flexibility of the commerce clause was the determining factor in its being invoked as a basis for control. Exclusive federal
legislation and rules for aviation would undoubtedly be advantageous economically,' but because the proponents of state rights still constitute a powerful factor in American politics, the idea of such federal regulation was abandoned. A compromise plan was then evolved which conceded powers to both
the state and federal governments. In spite of the consideration that the
Supreme Court has never gone so far as to regulate intrastate commerce
when it in no wise affected interstate commerce," and that the several states
have already passed rather comprehensive measures for the control of aircraft
which operate exclusively within their borders,8 the federal act makes it unlawful to navigate in aircraft otherwise than in conformity to the Air Traffic
Rules.
This rule would seem to be wide enough to include all aircraft
whether or not engaged in or in any manner interfering with interstate
flights. It may be that due to the very nature of aerial navigation most
flights would be an interference with craft navigating in interstate commerce,
but whether a given flight is an interference would seem to be a question of
fact to be determined in each particular. case." The court in the instant case
disregarded the provision which would make the federal rules applicable to
all aircraft and suggested substantially the same test to determine if the flight
were an interference with interstate commerce as has been applied in the
railway cases-Was the defendant's act such as to in any way interfere with
'U. S. CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SEC. 8 (3).
'WILLIAM V. ROSKER, REPORT TO CONFERENCE OF STATE AND LOCAL BAR
ASSOCIATIONS (ig2o) 6 A. B. A. J. 42. But in The Crawford Bros. No. 2,
215 Fed. 269 (W. D. Wash. 1914), the court held airplanes were not the subject of admiralty jurisdiction.
'For criticisms of this suggestion see BOGRET, PROBLEMS IN AVIATION
LAW (1921), 6 CoRN. L. Q. 271.
'For criticisms see BocGRr, PRoBLE1s IN AVIATION LAW supra note 4.
'ZOLLMAN, LAW OF THE AIR (1929)'§50; HoTcHKISs AVIATION LAW
(1928), §56; LOGAN, AIRCRAFT LAW MADE PLAIN (1928) at 40.
'Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., supra note I;
State of New York v. United States, supra note I, represent the greatest extent
to which the courts have gone to uphold federal regulation of interstate
commerce.
'The state governments have demonstrated that they intend to retain some
measure of control over aircraft by the passage of regulatory statutes, the
most prominent being the UNIFORM STATE LAW OF AERONAUTICS. The California statute is unique in that by one o.f its provisions the act was to become
inoperative and all control was to have been ceded to the Federal Government when it acted. Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering 1921) c. 783 § 13. But the
Attorney General has ruled that the Federal Air Commerce Act of 1926 has not
caused the repeal of the California statute.
IAIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, § I, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) 49 U. S. C. § 171,
makes it unlawful "to operate any aircraft otherwise than in conformity with
air traffic rules."
'°HoTcHKISs, AVIATION LAW, supra note 6, § 57; WILLIAMS, FEDERAL.
LEGISLATION CONCERNING CiviL AERONAUTICS (1928) U. OF PA. L. Rv. 798.
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interstate movements? ' While the efficacy of this all-inclusive ruling must
remain in doubt until the highest court has ruled on it, it is submitted that
the court followed a logical course in applying the same test to aircraft as
has been applied to the railroads, since the power to regulate both is based
on the identical clause of the Constitution.
AMBASSADORS AND CONSULS-JURISDICTIoN-SuIT FOR DIVORCE AND ALImONY AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS-A, ,vice consul

and citizen of Roumania stationed at Cleveland, Ohio, was sued for divorce
and alimony in a court of the state of Ohio.' His objection to the jurisdiction
of the court was overruled and an order for temporary alimony was made.'
A invoked Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution: "The judicial power
shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls," and also the Judicial Code 3 section 256, "The jurisdiction vested
in the courts of the United States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter
mentioned shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states, .

.

.

Of

all suits and proceedings' against ambassadors, or other public ministers,
• . . or against consuls or vice consuls." '- Held, upon certiorari to state

Supreme Court, that a state court has jurisdiction over suit for divorce
against vice consul. State of Ohio ex- rel. Popovici v. Agler, et a. (decided
in the U. S. Supreme Court, Jan. 20, 193o) IV U. S. Daily 3208.

The court, in the instant case, proceeds on the theory that the law of
domestic relations has always been reserved to the states 6 and that the federal courts have always disclaimed jurisdiction over matters of divorce and
alimony.7 The Constitutional provision in question, the court continues, does
not of itself exclude the jurisdiction of the states 3 In addition, the statutes
do not purport to exclude the state courts from jurisdiction except where
they grant it to courts of the United States. Therefore, the statutes can in
'
Railroad Commission of Wisconsin C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., supra note I.
'A suit for divorce between the present parties brought in the district
court of the United States was dismissed. Popovici v. Popovici, 3o Fed. (2d)
I85 (N. D. Ohio 1927) (The consul contended the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action).
2He thereupon applied to the supreme court of the state for a writ of
prohibition, but upon demurrer to the petition the writ was denied. State ex
tel. Popovici v. Agler et al., iI9 Ohio St 484, 164 N. E. 524 (1928).
a36 Stat. II6o §256 (i911), 28 U. S. C. §341 (1926).
'Italics our own.
'It has been suggested, that the provisions of this statute are so plain
as to leave no room for construction, and the courts should not read into it
exceptions or limitations which depart from its plain meaning. Puente Aimenability of Foreign Consuls to Judicial Process in the United States (1929) 77
PA. LAw REv. 447, 456.

8Ex parte Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593, 10 Sup. Ct. 850 (889), (this did
not involve a consideration of a case where the divorce action was against
a representative of a foreign country).
'Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (1858).
"Plaquemine -Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511, i8 Sup.
Ct. 685 (1898).
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nowise affect the present case since the federal courts have never had jurisdiction over divorce. The court in conclusion finds that the phrase, "suits
against consuls and vice consuls" must be held to have reference to ordinary
civil proceedings, and not to suits over which, prior to the adoption of the
Constitution, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction. The problem in the
instant case has never before been presented to this tribunal and though
treated with logical accuracy, its solution seems lacking in conviction. The
decision apparently overlooks the political judgment of the framers of the
9
Constitution by which it was intended to prevent the harassing of representatives of foreign governments with suits in state courts." Subsequent Congressional action" seems to indicate a reaffirmance of this intention. The
word "proceeding" as used in the Judicial Code, by a reasonable interpretation would appear to be broad enough to include an action for divorce. The
proper criterion of federal jurisdiction in these cases, it would seem, should
not be, that the subject-matter of the action once belonged to the ecclesiastical
court, but that the action is against a representative of a foreign nation accredited to this country.'
APPEAL AND ERRoR-IssuEs IN SUIT PERTAINING TO GENERAL ELECTION
RENDERED MOOT BY INTERVENTION, DURING TIME OF APPEAL, OF THE ELECrIoN
-X, as Democratic nominee for judge, brings bill to prohibit county commissioners placing name of certain person, Y, on the ballot to be used at the gen-

eral election. Injunction issued by lower court. Pending appeal taken by Y,
the general election was held. Held, That the bill be dismissed, because the
issues are moot. Tyler v. Peacock, 124 So. 463 (Fla. 1929).
The instant case represents a view uniformly concurred in by all the
courts-that "matters which pertain to the conduct of an election will not
usually be determined when, pending the appeal, the election has been held."'
Theoretically, the basis of such a view is that it is the function of courts to

decide actual controversies, not to give opinions on abstract propositions or
academic questions ;' practically, the reason is that the court is too busy to
9
U. S. Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. 2. See Davis v. Packard, 7 Peters 276
at 284 (U. S. 1833). PUENTE, THE FOREIGN CONSUL (1926) II6.
v. Higginson, 96 Misc. 457, 158 N. Y. S. 92 (1916) (de'°Higginson

nied state court jurisdiction of a consul in a suit for divorce or separation).
PUENTE, op. cit. supra note 9 at 123.
" The first Congress, by Act of 1789, provided that the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States over consuls and vice consuls "shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states." This was repealed by Act of 1875,
The original provision was
I8 Stat. 317 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 371 (1926).
reenacted in 1911, supra note 3. For summary of the legislative history of § 256
of Judicial Code, see Higginson v. Higginson, supra note Io.
'ROsE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (3rd ed. 1926) 193.

'Love v. Griffiths, 266 U. S. 32, 45 Sup. Ct. 12 (1924) ; People v. Sweitzer, 329 Ill. 380, 16o N. E. 747. (1928) ; Hollander v. Bailey, 148 La. 453, 87
So. 234 (1921); Sasser v. Harris, 178 N. C. 322, 100 S. E. 338 (1919); 5
C. J. 577.
2 California v. San Pablo & Tulane Ry. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 314, 13 Sup.
Ct. 876, 879 (1893) ; U. S. v. Hamburg Steamship Co., 239 U. S. 466, 36 Sup.
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do otherwise.' The criterion as to what questions are moot is the ability of
the court to enforce its judgment on such questions.' The general view has
been rigidly maintained even though the result is to deprive the appellant of
his common law or statutory right of appeal, and to inconvenience the public
by allowing uncertainty as to the construction of election laws to exist 0 The
deviations from the general rule have been few; only one court' has refused
to follow the general rule when the question involved was the construction of
an election law which was of great importance to the public. Such an attitude
would appear to be logical and based on the soundest considerations of public
policy. As far as the rights of the appellant are concerned, the courts reasonably take the view that if delay in taking the appeal is due to his own fault,
they will not consider his rights ;7 however where he has not been at fault the
same conclusion is reached, the courts even refusing to consider the case on
its merits in order to properly dispose of the question of costs and the appellant is penalized to the extent of the costs of litigation
On principle the
courts are justified in many of the cases in refusing to consider the merits,
but it is difficult to justify their attitude in controversies where a question of
great public importance, such as the construction or the constitutionality of an
elecion law is involved and where the refusal of the court to consider the
case would result in ,future embarrassment and inconvenience to the electorate.
Ct.

212

(ii6).

Discussion of general subject of moot issues, (1916) 4

CALIF. L. REv. 348.

"The demands of actual practical litigation are too pressing to permit
the examination or discussion of academic questions
139 N. Y. 446, 448, 34 N. E. 931, 932 (893).

. .

."; In re Manning,

'Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 16 Sup. Ct. 132 (1895); Sasser v. Harris,
supra note i; Williams v. Howard, 193 Ky. 848, 237 S. W. lO62 (1922).
'Williams v. Howard, supra note 4. Moreover the court will take judicialnotice of the occurrence of the election, pending appeal.
'Brown

v. Leib, 267 Pa. 24, 11o AtI. 463

(1920)

where the court said

"we have frequently stated we will not decide moot questions or abstract principles of law-however, owing to the importance of the question to citizens
and political parties desiring to nominate candidates to fill vacancies, we consider the merits of this case, although our action in this respect must not be
regarded as a precedent for the determination of such questions in the future."
Other courts have hinted at the correctness of such an attitude on the part
of the courts; Keller v. Rewers, 189 Ind. 339, 127 N. E. 149 (1921); Thom
v. Cook, 113 Md. 85, 77 Atl. 12 (191o) ; Southern Pacific Terminal Co" v.
I. C. C., 219 U. S.498, 31 Sup. Ct. 279 (191o) (not an election case).
Thom v. Cooke, supra note 6 (appellant did not file appeal until one
month after the election was held) ; Pofhansen v. Miss., 94 Miss. 103, 47 So.
897 (1910) (appellant filed appeal at time he knew court could not sit);
Kelly v. Millsaps, 139 La. 547, 71 So. 844 •(1916) (appellant did not appeal
until after the election was held).
'The question as to the disposition of costs is often neglected by the
courts, it being taken for granted they should be borne by the appellant. Only
one case has thoroughly considered the question: Ficklen v. City of Danville,
146 Va. 426, 437, 132 S. E. 705, 710 (1926) (where appellant was awarded
the costs on the grounds he was the party "substantially prevailing" on the
appeal). That such a question is necessarily involved is impliedly recognized;
People v. Rose, 81 I1l. App. 387, 388 (1898) ; People v. Sweitzer, supra note
I; In re Matter of Norton, 158 N. Y. 130, 52 N. E. 723 (I899).
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BILLS AND NOTES-EXTENT OF RECOVERY OF A HOLDER WHO FILLS UP AN
INSTRUMENT FOR AN AMOUNT IN ExcEss OF THAT AUTHORIZED--Surety
signed a note as co-maker, blank as to amount, and authorized maker to fill it
up to the amount of a certain particular debt owing from the maker to the
payee; this limitation was communicated to the payee when the incomplete note
was given him. Payee however filled it up for the entire indebtedness due
him from the maker, a much larger sum. Held, that the note was not entirely unenforceable in the hands of the payee, but merely as to the excess;
recovery was allowed against the surety for the amount authorized. Stout v.
Eastern Rock Island Plow Co., 168 N. E. 867 (Ind. 1929).
In the hands of a holder in due course, there would be no doubt that
such a note as the one in question would be enforceable against the maker
or surety for the amount actually filled in by the payee, despite limitations
on his authority.' In the past there has been some conflict as to whether one
who takes an incomplete instrument without any knowledge of a limitation
on the filling in of the blanks may be a bona fide purchaser o.f the same, or
whether the fact that the note is incomplete should put him on inquiry as to
the authority to fill it up. Although the former was the general rule in the
United States prior to the passage of the N. I. L., 2 it is now fairly conceded
that Sections 14 and 52 are, in effect, an adoption of the latter view, and that
such holder is bound by the actual authority given.3 Thus in the case at hand
the payee should have been restricted in his recovery, even in the absence
o.f the further and stronger evidence that he actually knew of the limitation;
since, having taken the instrument in incomplete form, he could not be a
holder in due course. The question of whether the instrument is voided in
toto or merely as to the excess by such exceeding of authority seems to have
been presented squarely before the courts in comparatively few instances.
The numerical weight of authority favors a recovery of the amount authorized,' and it is submitted that equitable results have been reached in many
cases by so holding. However, to establish this principle which permits recovI NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 14. A bona fide holder for value
could recover at common law. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 63 U. S. 96
(186o) ; Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45 (18o8) ; Gillespie & Co. v. Rogers,
184 Pa. 488, 39 Atl. 290 (1898).
The cases are collected in note (1916) 5
B. R. C. 702.
2
Huntington v. Branch Bank, 3 Ala. I86 (1841); Chemung Canal Bank
v. Bradner, 44 N. Y. 68o (1871); Simpson's Executor v. Bovard, 74 Pa. 351
(1873). A contrary rule obtained in England. Awde v. Dixon, 6 Ex. 869
(1851) ; Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & G. 147 (Eng. 1854).
' Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer, 183 Mass. 14o, 66 N. E. 646 (1903).
See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) I16.
'Before the N. I. L. Clower & Culpepper v. Wynn, 59 Ga. 246 (1877);
Jones v. Lewis, 87 Ga. 446, 13 S. E. 578 (1891); Johnson v. Blasdale &
Grubbs, 9 Miss. 17 (1843); Goss & Hammond v. Whitehead, 33 Miss. 213
(1857). But see Mackey v. Basil, 50 Mo. App. 19o (1892); Ogden v. Pope,
18 N. Y. Supp. 140 (1892). After the N. I. L. Hannen v. Peoples State
Bank, 195 Ky. 58, 241 S. W. 355 (1922); cf. Rodgers v. Baker, 136 App.
Div. 851, 122 N. Y. S. 91 (191o). "If the holder exceeds the terms of his
authority in filling up the blank, he can have no benefit from it, even to the
extent of his authority, for his wrongful act is an utter nullity as to himself." I DANIELS, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) 198.
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ery of the authorized amount as a broad rule o.f law would- conceivably open
the door to fraud and perjury; if the holder of the instrument is assured that
he is protected at least to the extent of his authorization, the temptation to
chance it for more may prove great. A filling up of a note for an unauthorized sum with an intent to defraud has been held a criminal forgery,' and
without regards to the merit or weight of such holdings in a purely civil
action, it would seem to be going fairly far to allow any recovery at all on
the instrument itself in the case of one who exceeded his authority for a
fraudulent purpose.' Although the instant case appears to be a meritorious
one, it seems difficult to reach such conclusion without a modification or extremely liberal construction of the exact and unambiguous language o.f Section 14 of the Uniform Act 7

CONDITIONAL SALES-EFFE C OF RuLE AGAINST SPLmTING CAUSES OF
ActioN UPON SELLE's RIGHT TO REPossEssION-A delivered to B a player
piano under a conditional contract of sale reserving title until "full payment"
of the purchase price, which was payable, in weekly installments. B paid
approximately three-fifths of the purchase price, and then defaulted on all the
remaining installments. Some time after the last installment became due A
recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace in an action for a part of
the total remaining amount then due under the contract, which was satisfied
by B. Because of the failure of B to pay the amount omitted from the claim
upon which the judgment was recovered, A brought an action of replevin.
Held, that the former recovery, when all installments were due, constituted
a bar to the present action for repossession. Rosestein v. Hynson et al., 147
Atl. 529 (Md. 1929).
There is a considerable divergence of authority as to what constitutes an
election of remedies by the seller in the case of a default under a conditional
sale.1 According to the better view and that adopted by the Uniform Conditioal Sales Act' nothing short of full satisfaction of a judgment for the
However, where
purchase price will bar a subsequent action for repossession
Rex v. Hart, 7 C. & P. 652 (Eng. 1836) ; Reg. v. Bateman, 1 Cox C. C.
i86 (1845); cf. Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531 (i86o).
' Green v. Sneed, 1ol Ala. 2o5, 2o7, 2o8; 13 So. 277, 278 (1892).
7 Section 14, sentence 3 reads: "In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against any person who became a party
thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with
the authority given and within a reasonable time."

'See cases collected in ESTRICH, INSTALMENT SALES OF GOODS (1926)
§ 312 ff.; BOGERT, COMMENTARIES ON THE UNIFORPM CONITIONAL SALES ACT,
2A U. L. A. .(1924) § 127.

2
ESTRICH, op. cit. supra note i, at 1010 (Commissioners' note to § 24 of
the Act) ; BocERT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 169.
3
Ratchford v. Cayuga County Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 217 N. Y.
565, 112 N. E. 447 (1916). See also Jones v. Snider, 99 Ga. 276, 25 S. E.
668 (1896), in which it was held that partial satisfaction of a judgment for
the full amount of the purchase price constituted no legal bar.
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suit is brought on installments of the purchase price before the whole is due,
the great weight of authority, even in those jurisdictions where the mere suit
for the full purchase price constitutes an election," is to the effect that recovery
and satisfaction will not bar subsequent actions either for the remainder of
the purchase price as it falls due or for repossession. But where money is
payable in several installments all of which are due it is the general rule that
a judgment in an action for a part of the total claim will act as a bar to any
future action for that part due and not claimed at the time the first action
was brought.' Thus, as the court points out, in a situation such as that in
the principal case "there was no part of the purchase price for which a suit
was then maintainable." Having decided this, the further result that an action
for repossession on the part of the seller is likewise barred may be explained
on any one of several theories: (i) that prosecuting the first action to satisfaction of the judgment constituted an election to treat the buyer as owner,
and that, having done this, the seller is estopped to set up title in himself for
the purpose of maintaining replevin; or (2) that what the contract did was
to reserve title until full payment of "all that part of the purchase price to
which the seller was legally entitled," and that title in fact passed to the buyer
by reason of "full payment" in law; or (3) that the seller must be held to
have accepted the first judgment as a determination of all of his rights under
the contract;' or (4) that, the seller's remedy being extinguished, title passed
by rule of law by analogy to the cases deciding the effect of the running of
the Statute of Limitations;' or (5) as pointed out by the court in the principal case, that to permit such an action would open a way to avoiding the
settled "doctrine of merger." An analysis of these theories so variously expressed shows that the difference between them is rather in the mode of expressing them than in substance, and that behind all of them runs the same
'Silverstin v. Kohler & Chase, i81 Cal. 51, 183 Pac. 451 (igi) ; Haynes
v. Temple, 198 Mass. 372, 84 N. E. 467 (i9o8) (action on notes) ; Schmidt v.
Ackert, 231 Mass. 330, 121 N. E. 24 (igi8) (action on notes). The theory in
these actions was that there was no legal difference between suit for the
amounts due and a voluntary payment thereof. Contra: Eilers Music House
v. Douglass, go Wash. 683, 156 Pac. 937 (i9i6).
' Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of Westfield v. Brown, 54 Barb. i91,
i99 (N. Y. 1869); Anhaltzer v. Benedum, 266 Pa. 113, io9 At. 597 (920) ;
see Stiles v. Himmelwright, I6 Pa. Super. 649, 652 (I9OI).
Contra: McDole
v. McDole, io6 Ill. 452 (1883).
A different rule has been held to obtain where the debtor separates the
obligation by giving several notes maturing at different times. Klipstein v.
Wolfson Holding Corp., 119 Misc. 49, i95 N. Y. Supp. 734 (1922). However,
the following qualification appears in Nathans v. Hope, 77 N. Y. 420, 422
(1879), "Where separate actions are brought upon several promissory notes,
the party . . . runs the risk of an order consolidating all of them into one
single action . ... "
'Francis v. Bohart, 76 Ore. I, 7, 147 Pac. 755, 756 (i915) (Judgment for
part of purchase price when all was due held bar to action for repossession).
"It having been possible to sue for the whole purchase price, it was his (the
plaintiff's) duty to have done so, if he chose to take that remedy at all, and
he must be held to have accepted the results of that judgment as a determination of all his rights under the contract."
"Chapin v. Freeland, i42 Mass. 383, 8 N. E. 128 (I886); Campbell v.
Holt, 115 U. S. 62o, 622, 6 Sup. Ct. 209, 210 (i885).
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rationale of superimposing the "doctrine of election" upon the "doctrine of
merger" with its corollary, the rule against splitting causes of action. Regardless of which theory we adopt, the fairness of the result reached and its
soundness as a practical matter, in that it will tend to cut down the ever-increasing volume of litigation with which our courts are burdened, seem almost too
clear for comment.

CoNFLIcT OF LAws-LAw GOVERNING VALIDITY OF MAIMAG-Defendant
and X were domiciled and married in Quebec. Thereafter defendant, husband,
having acquired a Massachusetts domicile, obtained a divorce in Massachusetts
from X, who was at the time domiciled in Quebec and not personally within the
court's jurisdiction. This decree was refused recognition in a proceeding in a
Quebec court. Subsequently, defendant, still domiciled in Massachusetts, married plaintiff in Quebec. This was a suit for divorce in Vermont. Held, that
no divorce could be granted, there being no valid marriage. Lariviereyv. Lariviere, 147 Atl. 700 (Vt. 1929).
While the extent to which prohibitions in the domiciliary law may invalidate a marriage valid by the leax loci contrctus, is a matter of considerable
uncertainty,' the general rule that a marriage invalid by the latter law is
invalid elsewhere is subject to practically no real exceptions.2 Such general
rule involves no unwarranted encroachment upon the right of a state to control the status of its domiciliaries; rather it sanctions the power of a state to
preclude the arising of certain legal consequences from certain acts done on
its own territory. Thus it seems justifiably operative as well where the reason for the invalidity of the marriage is incapacity by the lex loci contractus,'
as where the reason is non-fulfillment of local formal requirements.' This
,former aspect of the rule is given further support by the principal case. That
there could have been no incapacity by the leax fori is immaterial.6 The case
incidentally discloses that, in regard to the much-debated question of jurisdicaGOODRICH, CONICr OF LAWS (1927) § 114.
'An apparent exception is where local requirements have been held inapplicable to foreigners temporarily within the jurisdiction. GooDRcH, op. cit.
supra note I, at 254; In re Lando's Estate, 12 Minn. 257, 127 N. W. 125
(1912).
An interesting problem is presented by a federal statute providing that the
validity of marriages performed in a foreign country before a consular officer
of the United States shall be determined by the law of the District of Columbia. 12 STAT. 79 (i860), 22 U. S. C. §72 (1927).
'Blaisdell v. Bickum, 139 Mass. 250, I N. E. 281 (I885); Schaffer v.
Krestovnikow, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, io2 Ati. 246 (1917); Kitzman v. Werner,
167 Wis. 308, i66 N. W. 789 (1918).
' Canale v. People, 177 Ill. 219, 52 N. E. 31O (1898); Jordan v. Mo. & Kan.
Tel. Co., 136 Mo. App. i92, 116 S. W. 432 (I9O9).
'Accord: Cases supra note 3. The ingenious argument of counsel that
in holding the Quebec marriage invalid the court would be refusing recognition to the Massachusetts divorce decree, was of course rejected by the court.
The court is not warranted in considering the merits of the reasons for the
invalidity of the marriage by the lex loci contractus.
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tion for divorce, 6 Quebec lines up on the side of the minority of the United
States,-that domicile of one party is not of itself a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in divorce proceedings.7
COURTS-POWER

OF THE SUPREME

COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

TO

GOVERN

PLFAs-A statute enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature in 19291 provides that a defendant may bring upon the
record an additional defendant whom he alleges to be liable over to him, or
jointly or severally liable with him in certain causes of action by suing out a
writ of sci. fa. The manner in which such proceedings were to be conducted
was not stipulated, nor was power granted to the courts to supply this defect
by appropriate rules of court. Held, inter alia, that the Supreme Court might
outline the procedure under the act. Vinnacombe v. Philadelphia,297 Pa. 564,
147 Atl. 826 (1929).
At common law it was well recognized that every court of record had
inherent power to make rules of court regulating its practice.2 Moreover,
appellate courts could neither alter such rules nor create new ones.' Since
the rules were for the administration of the business of the lower court, it
was the best judge of their expediency. The power of the appellate courts
was limited to nullifying such rules as were unreasonable' or contrary to
law.5 The Act of 1836,' however, gave to the Supreme Court the power to
devise new writs and forms of proceedings to govern not only its own body,
but also the courts of Common Pleas. 7 But by a subsequent section of the
same act' the common law power of the latter courts to regulate their own
practice by rule is expressly affirmed. The instant case is the first in which
the court of last resort has exercised the power given it by the former section, and, in view of this fact, the absence of authority upon the question is
not surprising.' The seeming conflict between the two sections might be reTHE PROCEDURE IN COURTS OF COMMON

' See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note I, § 127.

'Monette v. Lariviere, 40 Quebec L. R. (K. B.) 350 (911).
'Act of April io, I929. P. L. 479.
'Barry v. Randolph, 3 Binn. 277 (Pa. i8IO); Vannatta v. Anderson, 3
Binn. 417 (Pa. 1811); Snyder v. Bauchman, 8 S. & R. 336 (Pa. 1822). See
Gannon v. Fritz, 79 Pa. 303, 307 (1875).

See Smith v. Valentine, i9 Minn. 452, 456 (1873) ; Trotter v. Heckscher,
N. J. Eq. 478, 480, 4 Atl. 784 (i886); Ex parte Larkin, i Nev. 9o, 95
(1877); Mylins Estate, 7 Watts 64, 65 (Pa. 1838).

4

-Topham's

Estate, 12 Pa. Dist. Rep. 4 (1902)

Orphans' Court invalid as futile and impractical.
' See Boas v. Nagle, 3 S. & R. 250, 253

holding a rule of the

(1817).

The Supreme Court

will also reverse a decision of the lower court where the latter has obviously
construed one of its rules of court wrongly. See Gannon v. Fritz, supra note
2. For other cases on the general topic see COURT RULES (Pa. 1892) vi et seq.
Act June I6, 1836. P. L. 784, § 3, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §20345.
Similar jurisdiction is given by the act over the District, Orphans, and
Registers Courts.
'Act June I6, 1836, P. L. 784 § 2I, PA. STAT. (West, I92O) § 4553.
The Supreme Court has long exercised its power to regulate procedure
in Equity, but this power is derived not from § 3 of the act of 1836, but from

RECENT CASES
solved by applying the first only to those cases where a claimant has a legal
right to bring another before the court to answer in a cause of action against
him but there is no exact form of writ nor form of proceedings to cover the
case. This theory is in corqformity with the purpose of the provision" and
is seemingly the one upon which the court proceeded. But even under this
view it is submitted that the objection of the dissenting judge, namely that the
provision giving the supreme court this power has been repealed, is insuperable.
Where a new statute covers the whole subject to which it relates all prior
statutes on the same subject are repealed by implication." The Act of 1878'
cited in the opinion undoubtedly gives the courts of Common Pleas exclusive
power to make all rules regulating procedure in said courts and thus abrogates the former power given the Supreme Court. The desirable result of
uniformity will probably still be attained, however, since the rules promulgated in the instant case will be adopted by the various Courts of Common
Pleas.

NEGLIGENCE--"PROXIMATE' CAUSE-SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEsT-After collision caused solely by defendant's negligence; plaintiff's automobile veered; due
to his own unreasonable speed plaintiff's chauffeur without negligence thereupon completely lost control of machine, which received increased damage in
striking a stone wall. Held, that plaintiff could recover for the entire damage,
which defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing. Mahoney
v. Beatman, 147 At. 762 (Conn. 1929).
"The proximate cause of the law is not the proximate cause of the logician." The problem of causation in the law, arising out of a maze of decisions
inconsistent in reasoning and result, has been resolved into certain well-defined
differences in judicial technique; thus, the issue of causation is no longer a
vague question, but a matter of viewpoint. It is generally agreed that the
defendant's conduct must be a causa sine qua non.' This is a simple question
of fact. The difficulty lies in determining the causa causas. Aciording to one
view, a defendant legally causes an injury which he should have been able
§ 12. For cases upholding the power in equity see Gibbons Appeal, io4 Pa. 587
(1884) ; Chester Traction Co. v. P. W. & B. R. R. Co., i8o Pa. 432, 36 At.
916 (1887).
"See REPORT ON THE CIVIL CODE (Pa. 1835-36), pp. 139-148. The purpose
of sec. 3 seems to have been to give the Supreme Court the same power possessed by the Chancellor in England under Stat. i3 Ed. I, c. 24 (285).
nFort Pitt B. & L. Assoc. v. Model Plan B. & L. Assoc., i59 Pa. 308
(1893) ; Newbold v. Pennock, I54 Pa. 591 (893).
SUTHERLMAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCrION (2d ed. 1904) 465, 472.
'Act May 24, 1878, P. L. 135, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) §§ 4553, 4554.

*See Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., i58 Cal. 499, 503, I1 Pac.
534, 536 (i91o).

* Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Wildman, 29 Ga. App. 745, 116 S. E. 858
Where plural causes concur, the situation is regarded an exception.
Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (igII) 25 HARV. L. REV. 323; cf.
(1923).

GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXimATE CAUSE (927)

142.
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to foresee as a result o.f his negligent conduct. 3 The entire question is one
for the jury.' This has been discredited: it confuses the test of negligence
with causation; it is greatly weakened by the qualification that a defendant
need not foresee the particular type of injury; improbability of injury is in
itself no reason for relieving the wrongdoer 5 Under another view, a defendant legally causes an injury which is a natural consequence of his wrongful
conduct.' The jury determines this, properly charged as to the types of intervening agents which may efficiently break the natural chain of events.' The
former view is often reconciled with this by holding the defendant to have
foreseen all that flowed in the normal course of nature from his wrong. A
third and more recent theory, expressly approved by the court in the principal case, establishes that a defendant legally causes an injury which his
wrongful conduct has been a substantial factor in producing.' The jury decides whether the defendant's act played a considerable part in causing the
plaintiff's injury, properly charged as to the weight to be accorded intervening factors. The value of this view is that a jury can understand its terminology; that, in course of time, "substantial factor" will crystallize into a
concept as satisfactory as "reasonable man." According to a fourth technique,
which in the last few years has won the respect of high authority, a defendant's conduct is the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury when it subjects the
injured interest of the plaintiff to a hazard against which the law affords
protection.' The court decides whether the risk encountered is one which the
principle of law relied upon by the plaintiff is designed to protect against;
it merely remains for the jury to find whether the defendant created that risk,
i. e., whether the defendant was negligent to the plaintiff. This view reduces
causal relation to physical relation, leaving practically no question of causation for the jury
Although differences in technique often lead to differences
'Munden v. East St. Louis Light & Power Co., 247 Ill. App. 270 (1928);
Migliaccio v. Public Service Ry. Co., io2 N. J. L. 442, i3o At. 9 (1925).
'Under this and the other iews to be noted, where the facts in evidence
support but one reasonable inference as to causal relation it is excluded from
the jury's consideration.
'Bohlen, Probable or Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability in
Negligence (I9oi) 49 U. oF PA. L. REv. 79 et seq., BoHiaLEN, STUDIES IN THE
LAW

OF TORTS (1926)

1 et seq.

'City of Douglas v. Burden, 24 Ariz. 95, 2o6 Pac. IO85 (1922) ; Wengert
v. Lyons, 273 S. W. 143 (Kan. City App. 1925); Strobel v. Park, 292 Pa. 200,
14o Atl. 877 (1928) ; see Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 356,
162 N. E. 99, io5 (1928)

(dissenting opinion).

'Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 5, at 162, BornIEN, at 29.
'Smith, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1O3 et seq.; Derosier v. New England

Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N. H. 451, 130 Ad. 145 (1925) ; see Anderson v. Minneapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 436, 179 N. W. 45, 48 (I92O) ("material");

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., supra note 6.
'GREEN, op. cit. =tpra note 2, at 2; see 4 RESTATEMENT OF THrE LAv OF
ToRTs (Am. L. Inst 1929) § 165; Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., supra
note 6, at 345, 162 N. E. at 1oi (majority opinion).
"The issue of cause remains generally such that reasonable men could
draw but one inference. Nevertheless, if courts must submit the question to
the jury as has been the practice, under this view the "substantial factor" inquiry is regarded preferable. It is only for such purpose that this theory
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in result, it is probable that the plaintiff in the principal case would also have
recovered under the classical views previously noted." Therefore, the scholarly
opinion of Chief Justice Wheeler is most significant in indicating the recent
tendency to forsake old formulm for a rationale of legal cause.

NEw TIAL--EFFcT OF VERDIcr OF PARTY GImNG GRATUITY TO JURY-A
statute' provided that if a party to a cause give any gratuity to a juror at any
time during the term of court when the cause was tried, the verdict should be
set aside and a new trial granted. After a verdict for the. plaintiff had been
reached, the plaintiff's attorney invited the jury to dinner, but withdrew the
invitation when the statute was called to his attention. Held, that defendant
was entitled to a new trial, though it was stipulated that the attorney had not,
previous to the verdict, intended giving anything to the jury. Ellis v. Einerson, 147 Atl. 761 (Maine, 1929).

Statutes such as the one invoked in this case are the result of a policy of
keeping free from influence or suspicion of influence the verdicts of the
courts of justice. The wisdom of a statute that preserves and safeguards
the verdict after, as well as before, it is reached may be questioned on, the
ground that any gratuity given after the verdict could not have influenced the
jury in its determinations, and that the disturbance of a verdict reached after
conscientious effort is unwarranted. Yet, it may be observed, that if the
giving of gratuities to the jury were to become a practice, the jury might,
either consciously or sub-consciously, be influenced to favor the party the
better able to make the gift. In jurisdictions where such statutes are not in
force, it must be found as a question *of fact whether the jury was influenced
by a gift, or whether such was a mere impropriety.2 The difficulty of determining such a question leads to the conclusion that the more practical and
workable rule is the one found in a statute similar to the one in the instant
case. In reaching its conclusion in the instant case the court proceeded on
the theory that the statute was remedial,3 and was, therefore, subject to a liberal interpretation' in order that the intent of the legislature might be more
effectually carried out. In so doing, the court construed a mere invitation as
accepts Smith's test; therefore it is regrettable that the court in the principal
case (at p. 767) regarded the two views so similar as not to discuss their
relative merits.
"Supra notes 3 and 6. For a more detailed discussion, referring to the
less important theories of legal cause, see Note in (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 485.

'Rev. St. c. 87, § iog (Maine).
'St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Ellenwood, 123 Ark. 428, 185 S. W. 768
(1916) ; Wetzler v. Glassner, i85 Wis. 593, 2oI N. W. 740 (1925) ; Brookhaven
Lumber Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 68 Miss. 432, io So. 66 (i8go).
*Remedial statutes, in general, may be defined as those having for their
end the promotion of important and beneficial public objects. See ENDLICH,
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (1888) § io8.
'ENDLIcH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 107; 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsmucrIoi

(2d ed. 104)

1244.
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a "gratuity" within the statute. Such a construction seems unduly liberal, and
it is questionable whether the legislature intended, in enacting such a statute,
that an absolutely valueless thing should be considered as a gratuity. It
would seem that the court would have been justified in denying the applicability of the statute, and would thereby have preserved a verdict which was
admittedly reached without any effort or intent to influence the jury.

PROPERTY-ESTATES TAIL-CUTTING OFF THE ENTAIL BY CONVEYANCE OF

TRUsTEE IN BANKRUPTcY-A tenant in tail filed a voluntary petition in bank-

ruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy sold the property as an asset of the bankrupt's estate, the tenant in tail acquiescing in the conveyance. Held, That the
entail was barred by such conveyance and the grantee took a fee simple estate.
Somers v. O'Brien, 281 Pac. 888 (Kan. 1929).
By virtue of statutory enactments in almost every state, a tenant in tail
may by deed convey an absolute estate in fee simple and thus bar the entail:'
and also all remainders and reversions. While the heir in tail is not bound to
fulfill a contract of his father for the sale of the entailed land' a lease made
by the tenant in tail will pass the estate for the term of years therein expressed.' An estate tail is not chargeable with debts or obligations of the
tenant in tail for a period longer than his life' unless it is otherwise provided
by statute.' An outstanding unsatisfied judgment against the tenant, will not
be let in as a lien or encumbrance on the estate where the estate tail is docked
by deed.' Under a statute authorizing an absolute conveyance by deed, the tenant may mortgage the estate. The mortgage deed does not of itself bar the
entail, as the whole estate is not thereby conveyed 3 and on payment of the
mortgage, the former estate is revived 1 ' However, if the mortgage is fore1

Pearsol v. Maxwell, 68 Fed. 513 (C. C. V. D. Pa. 1895); Ewing v. Nes-

bitt, 88 Kan. 708, 129 Pac. 1131 (1913); Collamore v. Collamore, 158 Mass.
74, 32 N. E. 1034 (1893); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 1O5 Pa. 335 (1884), note
23 Ann. Cas. 59 (1912).

- Lithgow v. Kavenagh, 9 Mass. 161 (1812); Moody v. Snell, 81 Pa. 359
(1876). The tenant cannot bar the entail by will, Laidler v. Young's Lessee,
2 Harr. & J. 69 (Md. 18o7); Theological Seminary v. Wall, 44 Pa. 353
(1863). Estates tail do not now exist as such in most of the states. In a majority of the states, estates tail have been abolished and changed into estates
in fee simple, WALSH, LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 152.
'Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 Harr. & J. 3o2 (Md. 1813).

'Laidler v. Young's Lessee, supra note 2, at 71.
'Hazzard v. Hazzard, 29 Del. 91, 97 Atl. 233 (1916) ; Waters v. Margerum,
6o Pa. 39 (1869); I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1903) 67.
'Williams v. Hichborn, 4 Mass. 189 (18o8); Holland v. Cruft, 69 Mass.
162 (1855).
'Maslin v. Thomas, 8 Gill 18 (Md. 1849).
'Doe v. Roe, 25 Del. 414, 86 Atl. 517 (1911) ; Todd v. Pratt, I Harr. &
J. 465 (Md. 18o3).

'Laidler v. Young's Lessee, supra note 2; Cuffee v. Milk, 51 Mass. 366
(1845).
'Laidler v. Young's Lessee, supra note 2.
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closed, a sale of the property bars the entail.'
The sale and conveyance by
a sheriff, on execution of a judgment against the tenant, of the land of the
tenant, does not bar the entail, and after such a sale and conveyance, the tenant may himself execute a deed for the purpose of barring the entail.,
Before
the present bankruptcy act, it was held that a purchaser from an assignee in
bankruptcy of a tenant in tail of the estate acquires a right to enjoyment determinable on the death of the tenant by the entry of the issue in tail, the
esate tail not being barred thereby.'
Under the present act, the trustee in
bankruptcy is vested with title to all property which the bankrppt could by
any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him.m The right to bar an estate tail is not
property but is an incident of the estate which the tenant may or may not
assert." The principal case seems to be the only one of its kind and gives a
broad interpretation to the provision in the bankruptcy act."

TORTS-FALSE

IMPRISONmENT-NEGLIGENCE

OF

THE

PLAINTIFF

NOT

A

DEFENsE TO AN ACTION FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT-The plaintiff accepted defendant's offer to take her home in his autonobile. When the plaintiff's street
was reached, instead of stopping, as plaintiff requested, the defendant drove
several blocks beyond. While the car was moving very slowly the plaintiff
'2Cuffee v. Milk, supra note 9.
Hazzard v. Hazzard, supra note 5. A sale and conveyance by the guardian of a lunatic who is a tenant in tail, made by order of the court, will pass
a good title in fee simple, In re Reeves, 1o Del. Ch. 483, 94 Ati. 511 (1915) ;
Williams v. Hichborn, sapra note 6. But one vested by statute with the
property of a convict cannot bar the estate tail of such convict and convey
the fee to a purchaser, In re Gaskell [19o6] 2 Ch. I.
'Elliott v. Pearsoll, 8 Watts & S. 38 (Pa. 1844); Doyle v. Mullady, 33
Pa. 264 (1859); Waters v. Margerum, supra note 5.
'LWillis v. Bucher, 3 Wash. C. C. 369 (U. S. 1818) ; St John v. Dann, 66
Conn. 401, 34 Atl. 11o (1895). But see Croxall v. Sherrerd, 5 Wall. 268, 285
(U. S. 1866).
"BAN RuPTcY Acr OF 1898, c. 541, § 70, a. 5, 3 U. S. CoMP. ST. (1901)
3451; it re Butterwick, 131 Fed. 371 (M. D. Pa. 1904); In re Burnett, 201
Fed. 162 (E. D. Tenn. 1912); Brown v. Crawford, 252 Fed. 248 (Oregon
ro18). Transferability is the test of the title of a trustee in bankruptcy, In re
Packer, 246 Pa. 116, 92 At. 70 (1914). If capable of being disposed of, or
its possession parted with by any means, and either absolutely or conditionally,
it passes to the trustee, BANRUPTCY AcT OF 1898, c. 541, § I (25), 3 U. S.
CoMP. ST. (1901) 3420; I REMIINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (1908) 539.
"it re Reeves, supra note 12. A power of appointment does not pass to
the assignee in bankruptcy, Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225 (1879) ; Brandeis
v. Cochran, 112 U. S. 344, 5 Sup. Ct. 194'(1884). While a trustee in bankruptcy cannot exercise a general power to appoint by will, Montague v. Silsbee, 218 Mass. 1o7, 105 N. E. 611 (1914) ; Forbes v. Snow, 245 Mass. 85, 140
N. E. 418 (1923), where the debtor has exercised such power given him, the
property is deemed in equity to be assets of the estate of the debtor so far
as is needed to make good a deficiency of his own property to pay his debts,
Shattuck v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448 (1917); Forbes v. Snow, supra.
'Local law determines whether particular property is within the classification, In re Shenberger, 1O2 Fed. 978 (N. D. Ohio 19oo).
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jumped to the ground, turning her ankle. The trial judge found that the act
of the plaintiff in jumping was contributory negligence, contributing to and
causing the injury. Held, that the defendant's conduct amounted to false
imprisonment, and that the negligence of the plaintiff was only referable to
damages and not a bar to the action. Cieplinski v. Severn, 168 N. E. 722
(Mass. 1929).

That negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not constitute a defense
in an action against one who has by a wilful or intentional act invaded the
"plaintiff's rights of personal security, has long been a firmly established principle.' The instant case, however, appears to be the first one in which occasion
has arisen to apply this principle to an invasion of the right to freedom from
confinement.' The requisites for the action of false imprisonment are: (i) an
act by the defendant intended to cause the confinement,' and (2) a conscious,
unprivileged confinement within limits set by the defendant3. A fortiori there
was here present the defendant's wilful act necessary for the operation of the
above principle, resulting in the exclusion of a defense based upon the plaintiff's negligence.5 Although the individualism of the common law which lies
as a foundation of, and is exhibited in, the defenses of voluntary assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, and consent,' has never been so extended as
to preclude a recovery against a wilful actor by a plaintiff who has been
merely negligent,' it is reflected in the cases where the defendant's wilful act
has been met by a wilful act of the plaintiff. The usual holding in that type
of case is, accordingly, that the plaintiff's wilful action is a bar to his reIn asserting the measure of damages, however, in circumstances
covery.
where, as in the instant case, the defendant's conduct has been wilful and the
'Giardina v. Stagg, 214 Ala. 301, 1O7 So. 857 (1926); Wabash R. R. v.
Speer, 156 Ill. 244, 4o N. E. 835 (1895) ; Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387,
76 N. E. 474 (igo6); Payne v. Vance, 1o3 Ohio 59, 133 N. E. 83 (1921).
The problem has arisen almost exclusively in actions for assault and battery or on the case for wilful and wanton negligence. Wabash R. R. v. Speer,
supra note I; Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238
(19o3); see Chicago, St. Louis and Pittsburgh R. R. v. Bills, 118 Ind. 221,

224, 20 N. E. 775, 776 (1888) (plaintiff wrongfully ejected from train).
'Wood v. Cummings, 197 Mass. 8o, 83 N. E. 318 (19o8); Gamier v.
Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 Pac. IOO5 (1!oo); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
TORTS (Am. L. Inst. 1925) §49.
'Whittaker v. Sanford, 110 Me. 77, 85 AtI. 399 (1912) (on board a vessel) ; Houston and T. C. R. Co. v. Roberson, 138 S. W. 822 (Tex. 1911) (on
a train); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 3; (1915) 63 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 573.
"'There can be no contributory negligence except where the defendant
has been guilty of negligence." Adams, J., in Ruter v. Foy, 46 Iowa 132

(1877).

'BOaL N, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 533; in Aiken v. Holyoke
St. Ry., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238 (1903) it is suggested that a reason may
be found in the criminal or quasi-criminal aspect of the defendant's act.
7
Supra note I.
'Redson v. Michigan Central R. R., I2O Mich. 671, 79 N. W. 939 (1899);
(witfulness against wilSpillers v. Griffin, 1o9 S. C. 78, 95 S. E. 133 (ii8)
fulness). Contra: Central of Georgia Ry. v. Partridge, 136 Ala. 587, 34 So.
927 (902).
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plaintiff's negligent, the decisions have not been uniform. Though some are
in accord with the dictum in the present case,' namely, that the plaintiff's conduct may be considered in mitigation of damages, the larger number of courts
hold, and properly, that where the injury is the natural consequence o.f the
defendant's wilful or intentional act," the negligence of the plaintiff will not
go in reduction of damages." A mitigation, due to the negligence of the injured, as in the instant case, .suggests a reflection of the now discredited theory
f comparative negligence.2
9
Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Davis, 127 Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904)
(under statute) ; Railway Co. v. Wallace, 9o Tenn. 53, 15 S. W. 921 (089o).
" Tuttle v. Atlantic City R. R., 66 N. J. L. 327, 49 At. 450 (IoI)
(plaintiff's act in attempting to escape did not break the chain of causation) ;
Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. I8i, 38 U. S. I8I (839) ; BoHLEN, supra note 6,
at i.
UGalveston, Harrisburg, etc. R. R. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 48 S. W.
563 (1898); McGowan, v. St. Louis Ore Co., 1O9 Mo. 518, I9 S. W. 199
(under statute); BnAcir, CoNTRRmuTORy NEGLIGEr (3d ed. 1899) §69.
"Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 (1878); Potter v. Warner, 9r Pa. 362
(879).

